Formal Verification of Cyber-Physical Systems

Marjan Sirjani

Cyber-Physical Systems Analysis Group Mälardalen University Västerås, Sweden

Feb. 19, 2024 NTNU: Norwegian University of Science and Technology Trondheim, Norway Mälardalens universitet





Acknowledgment: **Edward Lee, UC Berkeley** Acknowledgment: **All the Rebeca Team**

Background

- Distributed Systems and Actors since 2000
 - Carolyn Talcott (SRI), Gul Agha (UIUC) since 2005
- Concurrency Theory and Formal verification since 2000
 - Mohammad Reza Mouasavi (King's College London), Christel Baier (UT Dresden) since 2003
- Coordination Languages since 2003
 - Farhad Arbab, Frank de Boer, Jan Rutten (CWI) since 2003
- Timed and Cyber-Physical Systems since 2007
 - Edward Lee (UC Berkeley) since 2015

Recent Projects and experience with industry

- Serendipity: Secure and Dependable Platforms for Autonomy (SSF- 2018-2024), VCE
- SACSys: Safe and Secure Adaptive Collaborative Systems (KKS 2019-2024), VCE, Volvo GTO, Volvo Cars, ABB Robotics
- DPAC: Dependable Platforms for Autonomous systems and Control (ККS 2015-2023), 12 companies ...

Cyber-Physical Systems Everywhere!







Complex Systems: Connected via network, and Time-Sensitive

Vehicle-2-Everything(V2X) Communication



Volvo Cars Driver Assistance Systems https://www.volvocars.com/intl/v/car-safety/driver-assistance

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Complex Systems: Connected via network, and Time-Sensitive

Collaboration of Robots and Humans



ABB Robotics https://applicationbuilder.robotics.abb.com/en/home

Can We Trust Self-Driving Cars?

Tesla's new "Full Self-Driving" feature decided to change lanes and then brakes and stops on the Bay Bridge



https://theintercept.com/2023/01/10/tesla-crash-footage-autopilot/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYpzk6TEViQ

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TESLA CRASH - An eight-car pileup on Nov. 24, 2022, on San Francisco's Bay Bridge. Photo: California Highway Patrol <u>https://theintercept.com/2023/01/10/tesla-crash-footage-autopilot/</u> <u>https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WYpzk6TEViQ</u>

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Much older incidents

NASA's Toyota Study (US Dept. of Transportation, 2011) found that Toyota software was "untestable."

Possible victim of unintended acceleration



Industrial robot crushes man to death in South Korean distribution centre Nov. 10, 2023





Machine identified man inspecting it as one of the boxes it was stacking

BUT ... Cyber-Physical Systems are helping ...

- Smart cars help!
- Our not very smart car prevented a few accidents already!



BUT ... Cyber-Physical Systems are helping ...

- Smart cars help!
- Our not very smart car prevented a few accidents already!



We just need better methods to assure safety.

Example: What if you have two tasks where the order is important?

What happens when you forget to disarm the airplane doors!



<u>The Telegraph, 9 Sept. 2015</u> <u>https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/What-happens-when-you-forget-to-disarm-the-plane-doors/</u>

From Professor Edward Lee, UC Berkeley

Using Software instead of the pilot and the cabin crew, and a network in between.

Cyber-Physical Systems: Control Physical Components using Software through Network

Concurrency and timing problems.



A module that can receive either of two messages: 1. "open" 2. "disarm" Assume the state is closed and armed.



Using Software instead of the pilot and the cabin crew, and a network in between.

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1. "open"
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Assume the state is closed and armed.







We have Complex Cyber-Physical Systems Nowadays



Cyber-Physical Systems

We need Robust Development Methods

Formal Verification of Cyber Physical Systems

Model Checking: A Robust Analysis Technique



Model Checking: A Robust Analysis Technique



Model Checking: Prove Properties



(Formal) Software Verification is the act of proving/disproving that a program is bug-free using mathematics



Testing and simulation can only check a few cases



Software verification checks all possible behaviors

Different approaches for Modeling and Verification



Our choice for modeling: Actors

- A reference model for concurrent computation
- Consisting of concurrent, distributed active objects

- Proposed by Hewitt as an agent-based language (MIT, 1971)
- Developed by Agha as a concurrent object-based language (Illinois, since 1984)
- Formalized by Talcott (with Agha, Mason and Smith): Towards a Theory of Actor Computation (CONCUR 1992)

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 Friendly to the modeler and to the network systems
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Rebeca: <u>Reactive</u> o<u>bjec</u>t l<u>anguage</u> (Sirjani, Movaghar, 2001) Timed Rebeca: 2008

Based on Hewitt actors

Concurrent reactive objects

Java like syntax

- Communication:
 - Asynchronous message passing: non-blocking send
 - Unbounded message queue for each rebec (in theory)
 - No explicit receive

- Computation:
 - Take a message from top of the queue and execute it
 - Event-driven

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Rebeca: <u>Reactive</u> object language (Sirjani, Movaghar, 2001)



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Timed Rebeca (2008)

- An extension of Rebeca for real time systems modeling
 - Computation time (delay)
 - Message delivery time (after)
 - Periods of occurence of events (after)
 - Message expiration (deadline)

FIFO message queues become message bags containing tagged messages

A simple Timed-Rebeca Model

```
reactiveclass RC1 (3) {
   knownrebecs {
    RC2 r2;
   }
   RC1() {
    self.m1();
   }
   msgsrv m1() {
    delay(2);
    r2.m2();
    delay(2);
     r2.m3() after (5);
    self.m1() after (10);
   }
```

```
reactiveclass RC2 (4) {
   knownrebecs {
    RC1 r1;
   RC2() { }
   msgsrv m2() { }
   msgsrv m3() { }
main {
   RC1 r1(r2):();
   RC2 r2(r1):();
```

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http://www.rebeca-lang.org/

Rebeca

Home

Projects

Rebeca Modeling Language

Documents

Tools

Actor-based Language with Formal Foundation



uage) is an actor-based language with a formal foundation, designed in an effort to bridge the gap between and real applications. It can be considered as a reference model for concurrent computation, based on an actor model. It is also a platform for developing object-based concurrent systems in practice. Learn More

Examples





Publications

About

Actors and	Formal Semantics	Model Checker
Components	Rebeca provides a formal semantics	Rebeca models can be directly model

- Ten years of Analyzing Actors: Rebeca Experience (Sirjani, Jaghouri), Carolyn Talcott Festschrift, 70th birthday, LNCS 7000, 2011
- **On Time Actors** (Sirjani, Khamespanah), Theory and Practice of Formal Methods, Frank de Boer Festschrift, 2016
- Power is Overrated, Go for Friendliness! Expressiveness, Faithfulness and Usability in Modeling -The Actor Experience, Edward Lee Festschrift, 2017



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An example: from Requirements to Code **Train Door Controller** lock lock Driver close **Door Control** close Control Vetwork open Passenger Marjan Sirjani, Luciana Provenzano, Sara Abbaspour Asadollah, Mahshid Helali Moghadam,

Mehrdad Saadatmand: Towards a Verification-Driven Iterative Development of Software for Safety-Critical Cyber-Physical Systems, Journal of Internet Services and Applications, 2021



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Process: Start from the Requirements



Architecture



Architecture



Architecture



















Modeled as Controller

Properties



Doors must not be open while the train is running.

Properties



Doors must not be open while the train is running.



We want to verify that it is not possible to open a locked door or lock an open door.





We want to verify that it is not possible to open a locked door or lock an open door.



Reality: Iterative and Incremental Process



Reality: Iterative and Incremental Process



State Diagrams


Process: Continue to Formal Verification



Model Checking: Prove Properties



reactiveclass Train(10){

knownrebecs{
 Controller controller; }
statevars{
 boolean status;}

Train(){ status = true; self.leaveStation();

}

}

msgsrv leaveStation(){ status = true; controller.setTrainStatus(status) after(networkDelayTrain); self.approachStation() after (runningTime);

msgsrv approachStation(){
 status = false;
 controller.setTrainStatus(status)
 after(networkDelayTrain);
 self.leaveStation() after(atStationTime);

```
reactiveclass Door(15){
  knownrebecs{
    Controller controller;}
  statevars{
    boolean isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked;}
  Door(){
    isDoorClosed = false; isDoorLocked = false;
  msgsrv closeDoor(){
    isDoorClosed = true;
    controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed,
       isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor);
  }
  msgsrv lockDoor(){
     isDoorLocked = true;
     controller.setDoorStatus(...);
  }
  msgsrv unlockDoor(){...}
  msgsrv openDoor(){...}
 }
```



```
reactiveclass Door(15){
  knownrebecs{
    Controller controller;}
  statevars{
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  Door(){
    isDoorClosed = false; isDoorLocked = false;
  msgsrv closeDoor(){
    isDoorClosed = true;
    controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed,
       isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor);
  }
  msgsrv lockDoor(){
     isDoorLocked = true;
     controller.setDoorStatus(...);
  }
  msgsrv unlockDoor(){...}
  msgsrv openDoor(){...}
```



```
Controller controller;}
statevars{
  boolean isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked;}
Door(){
  isDoorClosed = false; isDoorLocked = false;
msgsrv closeDoor(){
  isDoorClosed = true;
  controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed,
     isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor);
}
msgsrv lockDoor(){
   isDoorLocked = true;
   controller.setDoorStatus(...);
msgsrv unlockDoor(){...}
msgsrv openDoor(){...}
```



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knownrebecs{
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statevars{
  boolean isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked;}
Door(){
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msgsrv closeDoor(){
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     isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor);
msgsrv lockDoor(){
   isDoorLocked = true;
   controller.setDoorStatus(...);
msgsrv unlockDoor(){...}
msgsrv openDoor(){...}
                                      unlockDoor()
                Unlocked &
                               Unlocked &
                                               locked &
                  open
                                 closed
                                                closed
                       openDoor()
                                       lockDoor()
```







```
knownrebecs{
  Controller controller;}
statevars{
  boolean isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked;}
Door(){
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msgsrv lockDoor(){
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   controller.setDoorStatus(...);
msgsrv unlockDoor(){...}
msgsrv openDoor(){...}
                                      unlockDoor()
                Unlocked &
                               Unlocked &
                                               locked &
                  open
                                 closed
                                                closed
                       openDoor()
                                       lockDoor()
```

```
reactiveclass controller(10){
  knownrebecs{
     Door door; }
  statevars{
     boolean isClosed, isLocked, trainStatus;}
  Controller(){
    trainStatus = true; isClosed, isLocked = false;
   msgsrv setDoorStatus(boolean close, lock){
     isClosed = close; isLocked = lock;
    msgsrv setTrainStatus(boolean status){
      trainStatus = status;
      self.driveController();
}
```

```
msgsrv driveController(){
  if(trainStatus){ // leave the station
    if(!isClosed || !isLocked) {
      if(!isClosed) {
          door.closeDoor() after(nd);
          delay(reactionDelay);
      if(!isLocked) {
         door.lockDoor() after(nd);
  }// end of if(trainStatus)
  else if(!trainStatus){ // arrive the station
    if(isClosed || isLocked) {
     if (isLocked) {
        door.unlockDoor() after(nd);
        delay(reactionDelay);
     if (isClosed) {
        door.openDoor() after(nd);
      }} ....
```



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msgsrv driveController(){
  if(trainStatus){ // leave the station
    if(!isClosed || !isLocked) {
      if(!isClosed) {
          door.closeDoor() after(nd);
          delay(reactionDelay);
      if(!isLocked) {
         door.lockDoor() after(nd);
  }// end of if(trainStatus)
  else if(!trainStatus){ // arrive the station
    if(isClosed || isLocked) {
     if (isLocked) {
        door.unlockDoor() after(nd);
        delay(reactionDelay);
     if (isClosed) {
        door.openDoor() after(nd);
      }} ...
```



Process: Model Check and Debug



Properties



We want to verify that it is not possible to open a locked door or lock an open door.

Model Checking Using Afra

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	¥>		isDoorLock	ed = fals	se;										7	_0			
ASYDE-Door		}												deer CLC		from controller	(A)		
ASYDE-Door-SaraV12														door.CLC	SEDUUR		@(4)		
ASYDE-Door-Sarav13		msg	gsrv_closeDo	or(){											8	0			
ASYDE-Move		isDoorClosed = true;																	
ASYDE-Move-Blocked		controller.setDoorStatus(lsDoorLlosed, lsDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor);							Time progress by 1 units @(5)										
ASYDE-Published		2														▼			
out		msc	srv lockDoo	rO{											9	_0			
src			if (isDoor	Closed){	// to re	move the	e concurrent	cy bug	g										
ASYDE-Published.dot			isDoor	Locked =	true;								passenę	ger.PASSE	NGEROPEI		assenge	er @(5)	
P ASYDE-Published.prop	perty		}												1	0 0			
R ASYDE-Published.rebeca			controller	.setDoorS	Status(isD	oorClos	ed, isDoorLo	ocked)) after(ne	etworkDela	yDoor)	;							
ASYDE-Published.stat	ł							door.LOCKDOOR from controller @(5)											
ASYDE-Published-Priority		msc	sry unlockD	oor(){											_	<u>*</u>			
ASYDE2Door		isDoorLocked = false:									1	1_0							
door-ehsan		controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor);																	
EdwardExampleFTTS		}							door.OPENDOOR from passenger @(5)										
EdwardExampleF11S_2															2	sertion failed			
EdwardExampleTTS_2		msg	jsrv openDoo	rO{									Attribut	0	a.	ssertion failed	1	Value	
EdwardTTSversusFTTS			//this if is for avoiding to open the unlocked door by passenger						▼ cont	roller				value					
► ≥ LF-Door-absent		//if (!isboorLocked){							▼ cont	tate Varial	oles								
► ► LF-Door-multipleModelTime		(/)							Controll	er.isClosed	ł		false						
LF-Door-noExternal		controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed. isDoorLocked) after(networkDelavDoor):								Controll	er.isLocked	ł		false					
► ► LF-Door-Simple			}						Controller.trainStatus true										
<pre>Figure 2 CF-Door-Untimed Figure 2 CF-Door-Figure 2 CF-Figure 2 CF-Door-Figure 2 CF-Do</pre>			Door					Queue Content											
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EF-Door-Ver2-withExternals					-									tata Varial					
▶ 🔁 LF-Door2		Problems	🔲 Analysis R	Result 🖾	Console	•					~		* 3					true	
LF-VerySimpleDoor	A	ttribute		V	/alue									Door.isD	oorl ocker	4		true	
🕨 🗁 out		SystemInfo)											ueue Con	tent	-			
V 🗁 src		Total Sp	pent Time	1										openDo	or() arrival	(5) deadline(in	finity)	from pass	senger
💶 LF-VerySimpleDoor.do	ot	Number	of Reached St	tates 2	26								N	low				5	
🛃 LF-VerySimpleDoor.pd	df	Consur	of Reached In	ansitions 3	35 116								▼train	1					
P LF-VerySimpleDoor.pr	operty	CheckedPr	operty	4	+10								►S	tate Varia	oles				
R LF-VerySimpleDoor.rel	beca	Propert	v Name	C	Deadlock-Fre	eedom an	d No Deadlin						► G	ueue Con	tent			-	
💶 LF-VerySimpleDoor.sta	atespace	Propert	у Туре	R	Reachability								N	low				5	
🕨 🚰 test1		Analysis	Result	а	assertion fail	ed							v pass	tate Varial	ales				
TimedTrafficLight		Messag	e	A	Assertion0										tont				

Property File



Counter Example Counter Example 1_0 train.LEAVESTATION from train @(0) Project Window 👯 💿 🖬 🗔 🛞 $\overline{\mathbf{c}}$ 86 % 🔳 2_0 Navigate Help -1 **Rebeca IDE** Time progress by 3 units @(3) 3_0 - -D R ASYDE-Publis... 🛛 P ASYDE-Publis... »3 ASYDE-Door-S... R ASYDE-Door-S... Counter Example isDoorClosed = false; v controller.SETTRAINSTATUS from train @(3) 7_0 isDoorLocked = false; 3 door.CLOSEDOOR from controller 4 0 msgsrv closeDoor(){ controller.DRIVECONTROLLER from controller @(3) 8_0 isDoorClosed = true: controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor); Time progress by 1 units @(5 5.0 3 9.0 Time progress by 1 units @(4) msasrv lockDoor(){ if (isDoorClosed) { // to remove the concurrency bug passenger.PASSENGEROPENDOOR from p lot isDoorLocked = true; 60 property } 10_0 ebeca controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor); controller.tau=>DRIVECONTROLLER from controller @(4) tatespace } door.LOCKDOOR from controller 70 msgsrv unlockDoor(){ 11_0 isDoorLocked = false; door.CLOSEDOOR from controller @(4) controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor); door.OPENDOOR from passeng } 80 assertion failed msasry openDoor(){ Attribute Time progress by 1 units @(5) //this if is for avoiding to open the unlocked door by passenger ▼ controller //if (!isDoorLocked){ ▼ State Variables 90 isDoorClosed = false; me Controller.isClosed 117 Controller.isLocked controller.setDoorStatus(isDoorClosed, isDoorLocked) after(networkDelayDoor); passenger.PASSENGEROPENDOOR from passenger @(5) Controller.trainStatus } Queue Content } //end of recative class Door 10_0 Now ▼ door als door.LOCKDOOR from controller @(5) ∇ 🔲 Analysis Result 🔀 📃 Console State Variables Problems Door.isDoorClosed 11 0 Attribute Value Door.isDoorLocked ▼SystemInfo Queue Content Total Spent Time 1 door.OPENDOOR from passenger @(5) openDoor() arrival(5) deadline(ir 26 Number of Reached States .dot Now Number of Reached Transitions 35 assertion failed .pdf ▼train Consumed Memory 416 State Variables property. CheckedProperty Queue Content rebeca Deadlock-Freedom and No Deadlin... Property Name Now .statespace Property Type Reachability passenger Analysis Result assertion failed State Variables Message Assertion0 ► Oucue Content

Progress Property - Timing

REQ ID	REQ DESCRIPTION	Elicited REQ ID
SSysSp	GIVEN the train is ready to run	SSysReq1
ecReq1	WHEN the driver requests to lock	
	the external doors	
	THEN all the external doors in	
	the train shall be closed and	
	locked	

Property: F train.running

Assertion: !(trainRunning)

Leave at time 0, Cannot lock the door and move until time 21 env byte networkDelayDoor = 1; env byte networkDelayTrain = 3; env byte reactionDelay = 5; env byte passengerPeriod = 5; env int runningTime = 15; env byte atStationTime = 10;

reactiveclass passenger(10){
 knownrebecs{
 Door door; }
 Passenger(){
 self.passengerOpenDoor() after(passP);
 }
 msgsrv passengerOpenDoor(){
 door.openDoor();
 self.passengerOpenDoor() after(passP);
 }
}

Progress Property - Timing

REQ ID	REQ DESCRIPTION	Elicited I	REQ
SSysSp	GIVEN the train is ready to run	SSysReq1	
ecReq1	WHEN the driver requests to lock		
	the external doors		
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	the train shall be closed and		
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Property: F train.running



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 Door door; }
 Passenger(){
 self.passengerOpenDoor() after(passP);
 }
 msgsrv passengerOpenDoor(){
 door.openDoor();
 self.passengerOpenDoor() after(passP);
 }
}

Process: Proceed to the Implementation



From Requirement to Code: Lingua Franca



• Using Lingua Franca Language

https://github.com/icyphy/lingua-franca/wiki



Lohstroh, M., Schoeberl, M., Goens, A., Wasicek, A., Gill, C., Sirjani, M., and Lee, E. A. Actors revisited for time-critical systems. In Proceedings of the 56th Annual Design Automation Conference 2019, DAC 2019, ACM, pp. 152:1–152:4.

Marjan Sirjani, Edward A. Lee, Ehsan Khamespanah : Model Checking Cyberphysical Systems, Mathematics, 2020















From Requirement to Code: Lingua Franca

Led by Prof. Edward Lee UC Berkeley

https://github.com/icyphy/lingua-franca/wiki



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Drivers inside an actor























Different Actors in a network

Lingua Franca realization of the train-door example

```
target C;
 1
 2 reactor Controller {
     output lock:bool;
 3
     output move:bool;
 4
 5
      physical action external move:bool;
      reaction(startup) {=
 69
        ... Set up sensing.
 7
 8
      =}
 90
      reaction(external_move)->lock, move {=
        set(lock, external move value);
10
        set(move, external move value);
11
12
      =}
13 }
14 reactor Train {
      input move:bool;
15
      state moving:bool(false);
16
      reaction(move) {=
179
18
        ... actuate to move or stop
19
        self->moving = move;
20
      =}
21 }
22 reactor Door {
      input lock:bool;
23
24
      state locked:bool(false);
25 -
      reaction(lock) {=
        ... Actuate to lock or unlock door.
26
27
        self->locked = lock:
28
      =}
  }
29
30 federated reactor TrainSystem {
     controller = new Controller() at host1;
31
32
      door = new Door() at host2;
     train = new Train() at host3;
33
     controller.lock -> door.lock;
34
35
      controller.move -> train.move;
36 }
```

Ľŗ



[Sirjani, Lee, Khamespanah,

"Verification of Cyberphysical Systems,"

Mathematics, July 2, 2020]

Lingua Franca

```
1 target C;
 2 reactor Controller {
      output lock:bool;
 3
 4
     output move:bool;
      physical action external_move:bool;
 5
     reaction(startup) {=
 60
 7
        ... Set up sensing.
 8
      =}
9⊝
      reaction(external move)->lock, move {=
        set(lock, external_move_value);
10
       set(move, external move value);
11
12
      =}
13 }
14 reactor Train {
15
      input move:bool;
16
      state moving:bool(false);
17 🖯
      reaction(move) {=
        ... actuate to move or stop
18
       self->moving = move;
19
20
     =}
21 }
22 reactor Door {
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      input lock:bool;
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      state locked:bool(false);
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26
        self->locked = lock;
27
28
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30 - federated reactor TrainSystem {
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31
32
     door = new Door() at host2:
     train = new Train() at host3;
33
34
     controller.lock -> door.lock;
35
      controller.move -> train.move;
36 }
0.7
```


```
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 3
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      output move:bool;
      physical action external_move:bool;
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        ... actuate to move or stop
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0.7
```



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 2 reactor Controller {
      output lock:bool;
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      physical action external_move:bool;
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     reaction(startup) {=
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36 }
0.7
```



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32
     door = new Door() at host2:
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33
34
     controller.lock -> door.lock;
35
      controller.move -> train.move;
36 }
```







React to events in timestamp order.

The State Space





 $G \neg$ (doorUnlocked \land trainMoving) ?

Model checking using Rebeca Implementation using Lingua Franca

More Readable State Space



Counterexample!



From Timed Rebeca to Lingua Franca



reactiveclass Controller(5) { knownrebecs { 3 Door door: 4 Train train; 5 7 statevars { boolean moveP; } 6 7 Controller() { 8 self.external(); 9 } 10 msgsrv external() { 11 boolean oldMoveP = moveP: moveP = ?(true,false); 12 13 if(moveP != oldMoveP) { 14 door.lock(moveP): train.move(moveP); 15 16 } 17 self.external() after(1); 18 19 } 20 reactiveclass Train(5) { statevars { boolean moving; } 21 22 Train() { 23 moving = false; 24 msgsrv move(boolean tmove) { 25 26 if (tmove) { 27 moving = true; 28 } else { 29 moving = false; 30 31 32 33 reactiveclass Door(5) { statevars { boolean is_locked; } 34 35 Door() { 36 is_locked = false; 37 38 msgsrv lock (boolean lockPar) { 39 is_locked = lockPar; 40 41 7 42 main { Opriority(1) Controller controller(do 43 train):(); 44 Opriority(2) Train train():(); 45 46 Opriority(2) Door door():(); 47 }



```
target C;
   reactor Controller {
 3
   output lock:bool;
   output move:bool;
   physical action external:bool;
   reaction(startup) {=
 6
 7
   ... Set up sensing.
 8
   =}
 9
   reaction(external)->lock, move {=
   set(lock, external_value);
10
  set(move, external_value);
11
12
   =}
13 }
14
  reactor Train {
15 input move:bool;
16
   state moving:bool(false);
   reaction(move) {=
17
18
   ... actuate to move or stop
19
  self->moving = move;
20 =}
21
   3
22
   reactor Door {
23
   input lock:bool;
24
   state locked:bool(false);
25
   reaction(lock) {=
26
   ... Actuate to lock or unlock door.
27
   self->locked = lock;
28 =}
29 }
30
   main reactor System {
31
   controller = new Controller();
32
   door = new Door();
33
   train = new Train();
34 controller.lock -> door.lock;
35
   controller.move -> train.move;
36 }
```



Verification of Cyberphysical Systems, Marjan Sirjani, Edward A. Lee and Ehsan Khamespanah, Mathematics journal, Mathematics, July 2020.

From Timed Rebeca to Lingua Franca



reactiveclass Controller(5) { knownrebecs { 3 Door door: 4 Train train; 5 7 statevars { boolean moveP; } Controller() { 8 self.external(); 9 } 10 msgsrv external() { 11 boolean oldMoveP = moveP: moveP = ?(true,false); 12 13 if(moveP != oldMoveP) { 14 door.lock(moveP); train.move(moveP); 15 16 } 17 self.external() after(1); 18 19 } 20 reactiveclass Train(5) { statevars { boolean moving; } 21 22 Train() { 23 moving = false; 24 msgsrv move(boolean tmove) { 25 26 if (tmove) { 27 moving = true; 28 } else { 29 moving = false; 30 31 32 33 reactiveclass Door(5) { statevars { boolean is_locked; } 34 35 Door() { 36 is_locked = false; 37 38 msgsrv lock (boolean lockPar) { 39 is_locked = lockPar; 40 41 1 42 main { Opriority(1) Controller controller(do 43 train):(); 44 Opriority(2) Train train():(); 45 46 Opriority(2) Door door():(); 47 }



target C; reactor Controller { 3 output lock:bool; output move:bool; physical action external:bool reaction(startup) {= ... Set up sensing. 8 =} 9 reaction(external)->lock. mov set(lock, external_value); 10 set(move, external_value); 11 12 =} 13 } 14 reactor Train { 15 input move:bool; 16 state moving:bool(false); reaction(move) {= 17 18 ... actuate to move or stop 19 self->moving = move; 20 =} 21 3 22 reactor Door { 23 input lock:bool; 24 state locked:bool(false); 25 reaction(lock) {= 26 ... Actuate to lock or unlock door. 27 self->locked = lock; 28 =} 29 } 30 main reactor System { 31 controller = new Controller(); 32 door = new Door(); 33 train = new Train(); 34 controller.lock -> door.lock; 35 controller.move -> train.move;

36 }

Lingua Franca Construct/Features	Timed Rebeca Construct/Features
reactor	reactiveclass
reaction	msgsrv
trigger	msgsrv name
state	statevars
input	msgsrv
output	known rebecs
physical action	msgsrv
implicit in the topology	Priority
main	main
instantiation (new)	instantiation of rebecs
connection	implicit in calling message servers
after	after
—	delay



Verification of Cyberphysical Systems, Marjan Sirjani, Edward A. Lee and Ehsan Khamespanah, Mathematics journal, Mathematics, July 2020.

From Timed Rebeca to Lingua Franca



reactiveclass Controller(5) { knownrebecs { Door door; 4 Train train; 5 statevars { boolean moveP; } Controller() { self.external(); 8 9 } 10 msgsrv external() { 11 boolean oldMoveP = moveP: moveP = ?(true,false); 12 13 if(moveP != oldMoveP) { door.lock(moveP); train.move(moveP); 15 16 17 self.external() after(1); 18 19 20 reactiveclass Train(5) { statevars { boolean moving; } 21 22 Train() { 23 moving = false; 24 25 msgsrv move(boolean tmove) { 26 if (tmove) { 27 moving = true; } else { 28 29 moving = false; 30 31 32 33 reactiveclass Door(5) { statevars { boolean is_locked; } 34 35 Door() { is_locked = false; 36 37 38 msgsrv lock (boolean lockPar) { 39 is_locked = lockPar; 40 41 42 main { Opriority(1) Controller controller(do 43 train):(); 44 Opriority(2) Train train():(); 45 46 Opriority(2) Door door():(); 47 }



target C; reactor Controller { 3 output lock:bool; output move:bool; physical action external:bool reaction(startup) {= ... Set up sensing. 8 =} 9 reaction(external)->lock. mov set(lock, external_value); 10 set(move, external_value); 11 12 =} 13 } 14 reactor Train { 15 input move:bool; 16 state moving:bool(false); reaction(move) {= 17 18 ... actuate to move or stop 19 self->moving = move; 20 =} 21 3 22 reactor Door { 23 input lock:bool; 24 state locked:bool(false); 25 reaction(lock) {= 26 ... Actuate to lock or unlock door. 27 self->locked = lock; 28 =} 29 } 30 main reactor System { 31 controller = new Controller(); door = new Door(); 32 33 train = new Train(); 34 controller.lock -> door.lock; 35 controller.move -> train.move; 36 }

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connection	implicit in calling message servers
after	after
_	delay



Verification of Cyberphysical Systems, Marjan Sirjani, Edward A. Lee and Ehsan Khamespanah, Mathematics journal, Mathematics, July 2020.

We may have to tweak Afra for different domains⁹⁸

Alignment of Time by Lingua Franca







Toward a Lingua Franca for Deterministic Concurrent Systems, Marten Lohstroh, Christian Menard, Soroush Bateni, and Edward A. Lee, ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems (TECS), 20(4), May 2021.

Lingua Franca suggests a Paradigm Shift

- Write a deterministic program
- Reduce the risk of bugs
- Have a more predictable system

Secure Water Treatment System



SWaT



Water Treatment System Rebeca Model

```
reactiveclass PLC1(5){...}
```

```
2 reactiveclass PLC2(5){...} reactiveclass PLC3(5){...}
```

```
reactiveclass Tank1(10){...}
```

```
reactiveclass Tank2(10){...} reactiveclass Tank3(10){...}
```

```
reactiveclass Pump1(10){...}
```

```
reactiveclass Pump2(10){...} reactiveclass Valve(10){...}
```

```
reactiveclass SensorTank1(10){...} reactiveclass SensorTank2(10){...}
```

```
reactiveclass SensorTank3(10){...} reactiveclass reverseOsmosisUnit(5){...}
```

```
reactiveclass Attacker(3){...}
```

main{

1

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15 16

17 18

```
PLC1 plc1(pump1,valve,sensor1):();
```

```
PLC2 plc2(plc1,plc3,sensor2):();
```

```
PLC3 plc3(pump2,tank3,sensor3):();
```

```
Tank1 tank1(sensor1):();
```

```
Tank2 tank2(sensor2,unit):();
```

Attacker attacker(plc1,plc2,plc3,pump1,pump2,valve):(chl,malMsg,attackTime);

Model Checking

State Transition Diagram



Properties

Security Analysis



Successful Attack Scenarios

Attack on Communications

#	Tank	Property	Injected Message	Communication Channel	$System \\State$
$1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4 \\ 5$	$\begin{array}{c} \operatorname{Tank}_1\\ \operatorname{Tank}_1\\ \operatorname{Tank}_1\\ \operatorname{Tank}_1\\ \operatorname{Tank}_1\\ \operatorname{Tank}_1 \end{array}$	Overflow Overflow Overflow Overflow Underflow	Water level in Tank ₁ is low Turn on Pump ₁ Water level in Tank ₁ is low Turn on Pump ₁ Water level in Tank ₁ is high	Sensor ₁ to PLC_1 PLC_1 to $Pump_1$ Sensor ₁ to PLC_1 PLC_1 to $Pump_1$ Sensor ₁ to PLC_1	$ \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{S}_{i+1} \\ \mathbf{S}_{i+1} \\ \mathbf{S}_{i+2} \\ \mathbf{S}_{i+2} \\ \mathbf{S}_{0} \end{array} $
6 7	${ m Tank}_2 { m Tank}_2$	Overflow Overflow	Water level in Tank_2 is medium Open Valve	$\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Sensor}_2 \text{ to } \operatorname{PLC}_2 \\ \operatorname{PLC}_1 \text{ to } \operatorname{Valve} \end{array}$	${}^{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}_{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}$
	$\begin{array}{c} {\rm Tank_3}\\ {\rm Tank_3}\end{array}$	Overflow Overflow Underflow Underflow Underflow Underflow Underflow	Water level in Tank ₃ is high Open Valve Turn on Pump ₂ Turn on Pump ₂ Water level in Tank ₃ is high Turn on Pump ₂ Water level in Tank ₃ is high Turn on Pump ₂	Sensor ₃ to PLC ₃ PLC ₁ to Valve PLC ₃ to Pump ₂ PLC ₃ to Pump ₂ Sensor ₃ to PLC ₃ PLC ₃ to Pump ₂ Sensor ₃ to PLC ₃ PLC ₃ to Pump ₂	$\begin{array}{c} \mathbf{S}_i\\ \mathbf{S}_i\\ \mathbf{S}_0\\ \mathbf{S}_1\\ \mathbf{S}_2\\ \mathbf{S}_2\\ \mathbf{S}_2\\ \mathbf{S}_{i+2}\\ \mathbf{S}_{i+2}\end{array}$

Security Analysis



Successful Attack Scenarios

Attack on Components

#	Tank	Property	$Compromised \\ Component$	Malicious Behaviour	$System \\State$
$1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4$	Tank ₁ Tank ₁ Tank ₁ Tank ₁	Overflow Overflow Overflow Underflow	$\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Sensor}_1 \\ \operatorname{Pump}_1 \\ \operatorname{Sensor}_1 \\ \operatorname{Sensor}_1 \end{array}$	Water level in Tank ₁ is low Turn on Water level in Tank ₁ is low Water level in Tank ₁ is high	${\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+2}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+2}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{0}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{0}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{0}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{0}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}{\overset{\mathrm{S}_{i+1}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}$
5	Tank_2	Overflow	$Sensor_2$	Water level in Tank_2 is medium	S_{i+1}
	Tank ₃ Tank ₃ Tank ₃ Tank ₃ Tank ₃ Tank ₃	Overflow Overflow Underflow Underflow Underflow Underflow	$\begin{array}{c} \operatorname{Sensor}_2 \\ \operatorname{Valve} \\ \operatorname{Pump}_2 \\ \operatorname{Sensor}_3 \\ \operatorname{Pump}_2 \\ \operatorname{Sensor}_3 \end{array}$	Water level in Tank ₂ is low Open Turn on Water level in Tank ₃ is high Turn on Water level in Tank ₃ is high	${\overset{S_{i}}{\overset{S_{i}}{\underset{S_{2}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}{\underset{S_{i+2}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}{\overset{S_{i+2}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}{\overset{S_{i+1}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}}$

Industrial Controller Redundancy

Controller redundancy!

Redundant controllers Redundant comm. Redundant I/O

Redundancy motivation: Critical applications/domains → downtime costly





- Redundancy hardware multiplication.
- Standby units (backup) ready to resume incase of primary failure

From Bjarne Johansson, ABB

Slide 206

Network oriented controllers

Controller redundancy impact

The trend:

Controller redundancy today:

Controller redundancy tomorrow:

Controller Redundancy

Controller redundancy synchronization over dedicated link.

Controller Redundancy

Controller redundancy synchronization over network..

Less specialized HW



More Ethernet and networking







From Bjarne Johansson, ABB Industrial Automation

Distributed control systems



Network Reference Point Failure Detection (NRP FD) algorithm

Johansson et al. (2023)

Inconsistency: existence of more than one primary controller



Modeling NRP FD using Timed Rebeca



```
env int heartbeat_period = 1000;
1
    env int max_missed_heartbeats = 2;
2
    env int ping_timeout =500;
3
    env int nrp_timeout = 500;
4
    env byte NumberOfNetworks = 2;
5
    env int switchAlfailtime = 2500;
6
7
    . . .
    env int networkDelay = 1;
8
    env int networkDelayForNRPPing = 1;
9
    reactiveclass Node (4){ //'\label{line:ls1_line9}'
10
11
        knownrebecs {Switch out1, out2;}
        statevars {...}
12
        Node (int Myid, int Myprimary, int NRPCan1_id, int NRPCan2_id, int myFailTime) {
13
            id = Myid;
14
            NRPCandidates[0] =NRPCan1_id;
15
            NRPCandidates[1] =NRPCan2_id;
16
            NRP_network = -1;
17
18
            NRP_switch_id = -1;
            primary = Myprimary;
19
            init=true;
20
            mode = WAITING;
21
22
             . . .
            if(myFailTime!=0) nodeFail() after(myFailTime);
23
            runMe();
24
25
        }
        msgsrv new_NRP_request_timed_out(){...}
26
        msgsrv ping_timed_out() {...}
27
        msgsrv pingNRP_response(int mid){...}
28
        msgsrv new_NRP(int mid, int mNRP_network, int mNRP_switch_id) {...}
29
        msgsrv runMe(){
30
            if(?(true,false)) nodeFail();
31
            switch(mode){
32
                 case 0: //WAITING : ...
33
                 case 1: //PRIMARY : ...
34
35
                 case 2: //BACKUP : ...
                 case 3: //FAILED : ...
36
37
             self.runMe() after(heartbeat_period);
38
         }
         msgsrv heartBeat(byte networkId, int senderid) {...}
39
         msgsrv nodeFail(){...}
40
   }
41
```

Modeling NRP FD using Timed Rebeca



```
env int heartbeat_period = 1000;
1
    env int max_missed_heartbeats = 2;
    env int ping_timeout =500;
3
    env int nrp_timeout = 500;
4
    env byte NumberOfNetworks = 2;
    env int switchAlfailtime = 2500;
6
7
    env int networkDelay = 1;
8
    env int networkDelayForNRPPing = 1;
9
    reactiveclass Node (4){ //'\label{line:ls1_line9}'
10
                                                              reactiveclass Switch(10){
11
        knownrebecs {Switch out1, out2;}
                                                          42
                                                          43
                                                                  knownrebecs {...}
        statevars {...}
12
                                                                  statevars {...}
        Node (int Myid, int Myprimary, int NRPCan1_id,
                                                         44
13
                                                                  Switch (int myid, byte networkId, boolean endSwitch , Switch sw1, Switch sw2, int myFailTime, Node nt)
                                                          45
14
            id = Myid;
                                                                     mynetworkId = networkId;
                                                          46
15
            NRPCandidates[0] =NRPCan1_id;
                                                                     id = mvid;
                                                          47
            NRPCandidates[1] =NRPCan2_id;
16
                                                          48
                                                                     terminal=endSwitch;
            NRP_network = -1;
17
                                                                     amINRP = false;
                                                          49
18
            NRP_switch_id = -1;
                                                          50
                                                                     failed = false;
            primary = Myprimary;
19
                                                                     switchTarget1 = sw1;
                                                          51
            init=true;
20
                                                          52
                                                                     switchTarget2 = sw2;
            mode = WAITING;
21
                                                                     nodeTarget1 = nt;
                                                          53
22
            . . .
                                                                  }
                                                          54
            if(myFailTime!=0) nodeFail() after(myFailT
23
                                                                  msgsrv switchFail(){ failed = true; amINRP=false;}
            runMe();
24
                                                          56
                                                                  msgsrv request_new_NRP(int senderNode) {...}
25
        }
                                                                  msgsrv pingNRP_response(int senderNode){...}
                                                          57
        msgsrv new NRP request timed out(){...}
26
                                                          58
                                                                  msgsrv pingNRP( int senderNode, int NRP) {...}
27
        msgsrv ping_timed_out() {...}
                                                                  msgsrv new_NRP(int senderNode, int mNRP_network, int mNRP_switch_id) {...}
                                                          59
        msgsrv pingNRP_response(int mid){...}
28
                                                          60
                                                                  msgsrv heartBeat(byte networkId, int senderNode) {...}
        msgsrv new_NRP(int mid, int mNRP_network, int
29
                                                              }
                                                          61
30
        msgsrv runMe(){
                                                              main {
                                                          62
            if(?(true,false)) nodeFail();
31
                                                          63
                                                                  @Priority(1) Switch switchA1():(1, 0, true, switchA2, switchA2, switchA1failtime, node1);
            switch(mode){
32
                                                          64
                                                                  @Priority(1) Switch switchA2():(2, 0, false , switchA1 , switchA3 , switchA1failtime , null);
                case 0: //WAITING : ...
33
                                                                  @Priority(1) Switch switchA3():(3, 0, true , switchA2 , switchA2 , switchA3failtime , node2 );
                                                          65
                case 1: //PRIMARY : ...
34
                                                                  @Priority(1) Switch switchB1():(4, 1, true, switchB2, switchB2, switchB1failtime, node1);
                                                          66
                case 2: //BACKUP : ...
35
                                                                  @Priority(1) Switch switchB2():(5, 1, false , switchB1 , switchB3 , switchB1failtime , null);
                                                          67
                case 3: //FAILED : ...
36
                                                                  @Priority(1) Switch switchB3():(6, 1, true, switchB2, switchB3failtime, node2);
                                                          68
37
            self.runMe() after(heartbeat_period);
                                                          69
                                                                  @Priority(2) Node node1(switchA1, switchB1):(100, 100, 1, 4, node1failtime);
38
         }
                                                                  @Priority(2) Node node2(switchA3, switchB3):(101, 100, 3, 6, node2failtime);
                                                          70
         msgsrv heartBeat(byte networkId, int senderid
39
                                                              ľ
40
         msgsrv nodeFail(){...}
```

41 }

Modeling NRP FD using Timed Rebeca



1	env int heartbeat_period = 1000;		
2	<pre>env int max_missed_heartbeats = 2;</pre>		
3	env int ping_timeout =500;		
4	env int nrp_timeout = 500;		
5	env byte NumberOfNetworks = 2;		(ministray) (ministray)
6	env int switchA1failtime = 2500;		
7			A B Water A Constraint of the
8	env int networkDelay = 1;		matters way waiting matters say
9	<pre>env int networkDelayForNRPPing = 1;</pre>		
10	reactiveclass Node (4){ //'\label{line:ls1_line9}'		
11	knownrebecs {Switch out1, out2;}	42 3	reactiveclass Switch(10){
12	statevars {}	43	knownrebecs {}
13	Node (int Myid, int Myprimary, int NRPCan1_id, "	44	statevars {}
14	id = Myid;	45	Switch (int myid, byte networkId, boolean endSwitch , Switch sw1, Switch sy2, int myFailTime, Node nt)
15	NRPCandidates[0] =NRPCan1_id;	46	mynetworkId = networkId;
16	NRPCandidates[1] =NRPCan2_id;	47	id = myid;
17	NRP_network = -1;	48	terminal=endSwitch;
18	NRP_switch_id = -1;	49	amINRP = false;
19	primary = Myprimary;	50	failed = false;
20	init=true;	51	switchTarget1 = sw1;
21	<pre>mode = WAITING;</pre>	52	switchiarget2 = sw2;
22	····	53	nodelarget1 = nt;
23	<pre>if(myFailTime!=0) nodeFail() after(myFailT</pre>	54	
24	<pre>runMe();</pre>	55 54	msgsrv switchrait(/[iaited - true; amink=iaise;]
25	}	50	msgsrv reduest_new_nev_int contervoid) ()
26	<pre>msgsrv new_NRP_request_timed_out(){}</pre>	5/ E0	msgsrv pingar iesponse(int senderwode)()
27	<pre>msgsrv ping_timed_out() {}</pre>	28 50	msgorv pau NRP(int senderNode, int mNRP network int mNRP switch id) {
28	<pre>msgsrv pingNRP_response(int mid){}</pre>	60	msgory heartheat (byte networkId int senderNode) { }
29	msgsrv new_NRP(int mid, int mNRP_network, int :	61	
30	msgsrv runMe(){	62 T	main f
31	<pre>if(?(true,false)) nodeFail();</pre>	63	<pre>@Priority(1) Switch switchA1():(1, 0, true, switchA2, switchA2, switchA1, switchA1failtime, node1);</pre>
32	switch(mode){	64	<pre>@Priority(1) Switch switchA2():(2, 0, false, switchA1, switchA3, switchA1failtime, null);</pre>
33	case 0: //WAITING :	65	<pre>@Priority(1) Switch switchA3():(3, 0, true, switchA2, switchA2, switchA3failtime, node2);</pre>
34	case 1: //PRIMARY :	66	<pre>@Priority(1) Switch switchB1():(4, 1, true, switchB2, switchB2, switchB1failtime, node1);</pre>
35	case 2: //BACKUP :	67	<pre>@Priority(1) Switch switchB2():(5, 1, false , switchB1 , switchB3 , switchB1failtime , null);</pre>
36	case 3: //FAILED :	68	<pre>@Priority(1) Switch switchB3():(6, 1, true , switchB2 , switchB2 , switchB3failtime , node2);</pre>
37	<pre>self.runMe() after(heartbeat_period);</pre>	69	<pre>@Priority(2) Node node1(switchA1, switchB1):(100, 100, 1, 4, node1fai time);</pre>
38	}	70	<pre>@Priority(2) Node node2(switchA3, switchB3):(101, 100, 3, 6, node2failtime;</pre>
39	msgsrv heartBeat(byte networkId, int senderid	71]	
40	<pre>msgsrv nodeFail(){}</pre>	-	a definition weblike
41	ł		

time +--497 (§1503 -> shift(+1900)

520 0: nodel/Frimary node2flackup switch1NRP net1miss1 net1miss1

Schedulability Analysis of Distributed Real-Time Sensor Network Applications

(collaboration with OSL, UIUC, Gul Agha, and Ehsan Khamespanah, UT)

Smart Structures

"... one highly intelligent bridge knows what to do when trouble arises: send [the engineers] an e-mail."

The New York Times



Finding the best configuration

- Modeling the interactions between
 - the CPU, sensor and radio within each node
 - interactions among the nodes
 - tasks belonging to other applications, middleware services, and operating system components.



http://www.rebeca-lang.org/

Rebeca Modeling Language

Actor-based Language with Formal Foundation

Rebeca (Reactive Objects Language) is an actor-based language with a formal foundation, designed in an effort to bridge the gap between formal verification approaches and real applications. It can be considered as a reference model for concurrent computation, based on an operational interpretation of the actor model. It is also a platform for developing object-based concurrent systems in practice. Learn More





Projects



SEADA

In SEADA (Self-Adaptive Actors) we will use Ptolemy to represent the architecture, and extensions of Rebeca for modeling and verification. Our models@runtime will be coded in an extension of Probabilistic Timed Rebeca, and supporting tools for customized run-time formal verification



RoboRebeca

RoboRebeca is a framework which provides facilities for developing safe/correct source codes for robotic applications. In RoboRebeca, models are developed using Rebeca family language and automatically transformed into ROS compatible source codes. This framework is



HybridRebeca

Hybrid Rebeca, is an extension of actorbased language Rebeca, to support modeling of cyber-physical systems. In this extension, physical actors are introduced as new computational entities to encapsulate the physical behaviors. Learn more



Tangramob

Tangramoh offers an Agent-Based



AdaptiveFlow

AdaptiveFlow is an actor-based eulerian



wRebeca

wReheca is an actor-based modeling

Design Decisions Network on Chip

Siamak Mohammadi, Zeinab Sharifi, UT

Bug Check Network Protocols

Fatemeh Ghassemi, Ramtin Khosravi, UT



Design Decisions: routing algorithms Buffer length Memory Allocation

Zeinab Sharifi, Mahdi Mosaffa, Siamak Mohammadi, and Marjan Sirjani: Functional and Performance Analysis of Network-on-Chips Using Actor-based Modeling and Formal Verification, AVoCS, 2013.

https://rebeca-lang.org/assets/papers/2013/Performance-Analysis-of-NoC.pdf



Deadlock and loop-freedom of Mobile Adhoc Networks

Behnaz Yousefi, Fatemeh Ghassemi, and Ramtin Khosravi: Modeling and Efficient Verification of Wireless Ad hoc Networks, volume 29, Issue 6, pp 1051–1086, Formal Aspects of Computing, 2017.

https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00165-017-0429-z

Performance Optimization Smart Structures

Gul Agha, OSI, UIUC and Ehsan Khamespanah, UT

Resource Management

Smart Transport Hubs

Andrea Polini, Francesco De Angelis, Unicam Smart Mobility Lab.



Schedulability Analysis of Distributed Real-Time Sensor Network: Finding the best configuration

Ehsan Khamespanah, Kirill Mechitov, Marjan Sirjani, Gul Agha: Modeling and Analyzing Real-Time Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks Using Actors and Model Checking, Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 2017.

https://rebeca-lang.org/assets/papers/2017/Modeling-and-Analyzing-Real-Time-Wireless-Sensorand-Actuator-Networks-Using-Actors-and-Model-Checking.pdf





Minimize:

Number of service disruptions Number of mobility resources in smart hubs

Cost of mobility for commuters

Travel time for commuters

Travel distance for commuters

Jacopo de Berardinis, Giorgio Forcina, Ali Jafari, Marjan Sirjani: Actor-based macroscopic modeling and simulation for smart urban planning. Sci. Comput. Program. 168: 142-164 (2018) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167642318303459?via%3Dihub

Performance Optimization Smart Structures

Gul Agha, OSI, UIUC and Ehsan Khamespanah, UT

Resource Management

Smart Transport Hubs

Andrea Polini, Francesco De Angelis, Unicam Smart Mobility Lab.

but also re-but also re-Schedulability And User Satisfaction Network: Finding the best configuration

Ehsan Khamespanah, Kirill Mechitov, Marjan Sirjani, Gul Agha: Modeling and Analyzing Real-Time Wireless Sensor and Actuator Networks Using Actors and Model Checking, Software Tools for Technology Transfer, 2017.

https://rebeca-lang.org/assets/papers/2017/Modeling-and-Analyzing-Real-Time-Wireless-Sensorand-Actuator-Networks-Using-Actors-and-Model-Checking.pdf

Not only Safety and Robustnes but also Performance, Cost and Number of service disruptions Number of mobility resources in smart hubs

Cost of mobility for commuters

Travel time for commuters

Travel distance for commuters

Jacopo de Berardinis, Giorgio Forcina, Ali Jafari, Marjan Sirjani: Actor-based macroscopic modeling and simulation for smart urban planning. Sci. Comput. Program. 168: 142-164 (2018) https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167642318303459?via%3Dihub

Adaptive Flow Management Air Traffic Control

UC Berkeley, Edward Lee and Sharif, Ali Movaghar



Volvo-CE, Stephan Baumgart and Torbjörn Martinsson



Adaptive Air Traffic Control: Safe rerouting of airplanes using Magnifier

Maryam Bagheri, Marjan Sirjani, Ehsan Khamespanah, Christel Baier, Ali Movaghar, Magnifier: A Compositional Analysis Approach for Autonomous Traffic Control, IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering, 2021 <u>https://rebeca-lang.org/assets/papers/2021/Magnifier-A-Compositional-Analysis-</u> Approach-for-Autonomous-Traffic-Control.pdf

<complex-block>

Safe and optimized fleet control

Marjan Sirjani, Giorgio Forcina, Ali Jafari, Stephan Baumgart, Ehsan Khamespanah, Ali Sedaghatbaf: An Actor-based Design Platform for System of Systems, IEEE 43th Annual Computers, Software, and Applications Conference (COMPSAC), 2019 <u>https://rebeca-lang.org/assets/papers/2019/An-Actor-based-Design-Platform-for-System-of-</u> Systems.pdf

Anomaly Detection

Model-Based Cyber-Security

UC Berkeley, Edward Lee and Sharif, Ali Movaghar

Time Analysis

Connected Medical Systems

John Hatcliff, U. of Kansas, and Fatemeh Ghassemi, UT



MAPE-K architecture (Monitor- Analysis – Plan – Execute)- Knowledge

Runtime monitor to check the system behavior using a Tiny
 Digital Twin

Fereidoun Moradi, Maryam Bagheri, Hanieh Rahmati, Hamed Yazdi, Sara Abbaspour Asadollah, Marjan Sirjani, Monitoring Cyber-Physical Systems using a Tiny Twin to Prevent Cyber-Attacks, 28th International Symposium on Model Checking of Software (SPIN), 2022

https://rebeca-lang.org/assets/papers/2022/Monitoring-Cyber-Physical-Systems-Using-a-Tiny-Twin-to-Prevent-Cyber-Attacks.pdf



Local properties of devices are assured by the vendors at the development time.

Verify the satisfaction of timing communication requirements.

Helpful for dynamic network configuration or capacity planning.

Mahsa Zarneshan, Fatemeh Ghassemi, Ehsan Khamespanah, Marjan Sirjani, John Hatcliff: Specification and Verification of Timing Properties in Interoperable Medical Systems. Log. Methods Comput. Sci. 18(2) (2022) https://lmcs.episciences.org/9639



We need both Robustness and Friendliness!!

Examples from Industrial Partners

- ABB
- Volvo Construction Equipment
- Volvo Trucks





Construction Equipment

VOLVO GROUP








Thanks to Christian Menard (TU Dresden) for this example.



Thanks to Christian Menard (TU Dresden) for this example.

Volvo CE Example



Volvo Trucks Example





Volvo GPSS

A Generic Photogrametry based Sensor System



Volvo Trucks Example





Volvo GPSS

A Generic Photogrametry based Sensor System



Volvo Trucks Example





Volvo GPSS

A Generic Photogrametry based Sensor System



Thank you!!